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FACTS 
Appellees, for nearly all "facts" specified in their Response Brief, fail to cite to the 
record. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a]ll statements of fact . . . shall 
be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Rule 24(k) allows this Court to disregard or strike, on motion 
or sua sponte, all unsupported factual assertions. 
Also, rather than controvert Appellant's citations to the record, appellees, in a 
wholly unsupported and conclusory manner, merely and repeatedly state that Appellant 
Ferguson "failed to offer any evidence" (Appellees' Br. at 3), or "FAILED TO 
PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE" (id at 4) or he "pointed to no evidence at trial" (id at 9) 
or the "total absence of any evidence presented at trial" (id. at 10) or to "no evidence 
presented below" (id.) or he "offered no evidence at trial" (id. at 11) or of "no evidence" 
(id. at 12) or "Ferguson doesn't identify any evidence offered at trial" (id. at 14) or "the 
evidence offered at trial did not support such a claim" (id.) or he "failed to present any 
evidence of damage" (id. at 15), and rest on the result below by only asserting 
"Ferguson's failure to present any evidence in support of his claim." (Id.). 
Ferguson cited to the summary judgment proceedings, including specific 
deposition testimony and exhibits, and to the trial transcript to show that 
defendants/appellees acted with malice and thus abused any conditional privilege that 
may have existed. In this record evidence, Ferguson illustrated the self-contradictory 
testimony from defendants/appellees and the unsupportable statements made when 
compared to the facts of the situation. The jury should have been allowed to determine 
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this matter based on the direct evidence from Arthur Glenn and Gary Ferguson and the 
circumstantial evidence from the context and circumstances surrounding the situation; 
and, thus, the directed verdict was error. The Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second 
Edition, provide details of the jury's role in this regard: 
CV120 Direct and circumstantial evidence. 
A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances that allow 
someone to reasonably infer the truth of the facts to be proved. For 
example, if the fact to be proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a 
witness testifies that she saw Johnny take a bite of the cherry pie, that is 
direct evidence of the fact. If the witness testifies that she saw Johnny with 
cherries smeared on his face and an empty pie plate in his hand, that is 
circumstantial evidence of the fact. 
CV121 Believability of witnesses. 
Testimony in this case will be given under oath. You must evaluate the 
believability of that testimony. You may believe all or any part of the 
testimony of a witness. You may also believe one witness against many 
witnesses or many against one, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may want to consider the 
following: 
(1) Personal interest. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was 
affected one way or the other by any personal interest the witness has in the 
case? 
(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by 
any bias or prejudice? 
(3) Demeanor. Is there anything about the witness's appearance, 
conduct or actions that causes you to give more or less weight to the 
testimony? 
(4) Consistency. How does the testimony tend to support or not support 
other believable evidence that is offered in the case? 
(5) Knowledge. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know what 
[he] is testifying about? 
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(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable? 
(7) Reasonableness. Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light 
of human experience? 
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate 
testimony. You are the ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability. 
CV122 Inconsistent statements. 
You may believe that a witness, on another occasion, made a statement 
inconsistent with that witness's testimony given here. That doesn't mean 
that you are required to disregard the testimony. It is for you to decide 
whether to believe the witness. 
CV123 Effect of willfully false testimony. 
If you believe any witness has intentionally testified falsely about any 
important matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, or 
you may disregard only the intentionally false testimony. 
Ferguson presented competent evidence showing that Williams made both 
inconsistent statements and willfully false testimony; indeed, he could not even point to 
any specific instance of Ferguson over-billing! (R. at 185, Ex. E at 98-101; 864-158). 
Williams stated the law firm was "unable to determine which specific entries - typically 
were unable to determine which specific entries reflected bills for work he [Ferguson] did 
not do." (R. at 864-224 to -225). No one in the firm reported this over-billing to the 
Utah State Bar, which all who "knew" this to be "true" were ethically bound to do. (R. 
at 864-259 to -261). Ferguson thus showed inconsistent and willfully false testimony that 
should have reached the jury. 
The directed verdict was improper in this case because "[i]f there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence that would support a verdict in favor of the losing party, the directed 
verdict cannot stand." Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991) (citing 
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Management Comm. of Gray stone Pines Homeowners Ass 'n v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982)). And, "whether the holder of the [conditional] privilege 
lost it due to abuse presents a question of fact." O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, *[f 
38, 165 P.3d 1214, 1224 (citing Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad, Inc., 2005 UT 25, ^ 
53, 116 P.3d 271; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 
Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272, 274-75 (1951)). A federal district court sitting in diversity, and 
thus, applying Utah law, succinctly explained why: "Whether Defendants acted with 
malice is a determination for a jury to make after hearing the evidence and assessing the 
credibility of those who testify. For this court to make such a finding would invade the 
province of the jury and constitute reversible error." Murphree v. US Bank of Utah, N.A., 
282 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298-99 (D. Utah 2003). The jury should have had the 
opportunity to weigh the inconsistent statements heard at trial and accept or reject what 
could have constituted willfully false testimony from defendant Williams, and the bald 
unsupported assertions in appellees' response mirror the reasoning in directing a verdict 
in the first place. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
Defendants/appellees hope to avoid this Court's long-standing and still binding 
conditional privilege precedent by "correcting" this Court in arguing that old precedent, 
namely Hales v. Commercial Bank, 197 P.2d 910 (Utah 1948), no longer applies due to 
United States Supreme Court defamation law developments. Appellees also cite to 
several non-Utah cases, which do not prove instructive in the present case because clearly 
applicable precedent from this Court exists and governs. See O'Connor, 2007 UT 58, 
165 P.3d 1214; Wayment v. Clear Channel Borad, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 272. 
Whatever appellees' protestations, Utah cases faithfully follow the United States 
Supreme Court's teachings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1972). Hales remains good law and this 
Court's recent defamation cases control this action and dictate reversal of the trial court's 
directed verdict. 
The Utah common law reasonable belief standard (and as discussed below, it 
comports with the actual malice concept defendants/appellees argue for) fits within 
permissible "knowledge" or "reckless disregard" post Gertz and post Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 601 merger into section 600. Truly, the reasonable belief 
standard and the common law malice standard are not mutually exclusive. The Combes 
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272, 275 (Utah 1951) case, which cited to the 
Hales case, stated in addition to the required factors for a conditional privilege to apply, 
"[tjhere must also be an honest belief in the truth of the statement. When these facts are 
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found to exist, the communication is protected by the law, unless the plaintiff can show 
malice on the defendant's part; the burden in this respect being on the plaintiff." The 
Combes court embraced the same heightened requirement to defeat the conditional 
privilege as the post Gertz cases and Restatement counsel: 
It should be borne in mind that there is a distinction between the malice 
which is implied from every defamatory publication and the actual malice 
which is necessary to remove a conditional provilege [sic], the privileged 
communication being an exception to the rule that every such defamatory 
publication implies malice; National Standard Life Ins. Co v. Billington, 
Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 491 at page 493, states a definition of this type of 
malice which has been used and approved by numerous courts: 'This kind 
of malice * * * which overcomes and destroys the privilege, is, of course, 
quite distinct from that which the law, in the first instance, imputes with 
respect to every defamatory charge, irrespective of motive. It has been 
defined to be an indirect and wicked motive which induces the defendant 
to defame the plaintiff." 
Where the conditional privilege exists, the defendant is protected unless 
plaintiff pleads and proves facts which indicate actual malice in that the 
utterances were made from spite, ill will or hatred toward him and, unless 
the plaintiff produces such evidence, there is no issue to be submitted to the 
jury, Speilberg v Kuhn & Brother Co. et aL, 39 Utah 276, 116 P. 1027; 
Williams v. Standard Examiner Pub. Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1. The law 
concerning this principle is well stated by the court in the case of Wagner v. 
Scott, 164 Mo. 289, 63 S.W. 1107, where the court, quoting from Newell, 
Slander and Libel, says at page 1111: 'The jury, however, will be the 
proper tribunal to determine the question of express malice where evidence 
of ill will is forthcoming; but if, taken in connection with admitted facts, 
the words complained of are such as must have been used honestly and in 
good faith by the defendant, the judge may withdraw the case from a jury, 
and direct a verdict for the defendant.' 
228 P.2d at 276-77 (emphasis added). Ferguson meets this long-standing Utah common 
law malice requirement to defeat any possible conditional privilege defendants/appellees 
may invoke due to defendant Williams* admissions on cross-examination. (R. at 864-224 
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to -226). Utah law is in complete harmony with United States Supreme Court precedent 
and Restatement principles. 
This Court's precedent controls the outcome of this case. The Restatement may 
inform this Court and other Utah courts, but the Restatement need not control the issues 
present here because: 
The American Law Institute's restatements are drafted by legal scholars 
who attempt to summarize the state of the law in a given area, predict how 
the law is changing, and suggest the direction the law should take. The 
restatement serves an appropriate advisory role to courts in approaching 
unsettled areas of law. We emphasize, however, that section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, as drafted in 1965, is not binding on our 
decision in this case except insofar as we explicitly adopt its various 
doctrinal principles. 
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, the concepts found 
in section 600 harmonize with both past and current Utah precedent, the trial court 
merely misapprehended both sources of authority when it instead applied inapposite 
Alaska law to this case, DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672 (Alaska 2006) and Mount Juneau 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1995), in granting the directed 
verdict, which constitutes reversible error. 
Defendants/appellees destroyed Ferguson's reputation. u'At its core, an action for 
defamation is intended to protect an individual's interest in maintaining a good 
reputation.'" West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). In Utah, 
"a statement is defamatory if it impeaches an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or 
reputation and thereby exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." 
West, 872 P.2d at 1008 (citing Cox, 761 P.2d at 561 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-
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2(1))). This Court recognizes that "the integrity of an individual's reputation is essential 
to his standing in society, in his vocation, and even in his family." Seegmiller v. KSL, 
Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981). Defendants/appellees defamed Ferguson, damaging 
his good reputation in the medical malpractice defense field in the process, with actual 
malice, and therefore abused any conditional privilege that would have otherwise applied. 
Several federal court decisions have analyzed and followed this Court's consistent 
conditional privilege decisions. Recently, in MacArthur, the district court explained: 
As detailed most recently in the Wayment opinion, the question of 
"requisite degree of fault" that must be shown largely turns upon whether 
the plaintiff is in some sense a "public figure." 2005 UT 25, fflf 17-36, 116 
P.3d 271, 279-84. If a plaintiff is a non-"public" private individual, "the 
necessary degree of fault which must be shown in a defamation action ... is 
negligence." Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 973; accord, In re I.M.L. v. State of 
Utah, 2002 UT 110, \ 25, 61 P.3d 1038, 1045 ("in a civil action for libel 
'actual malice' is required if the statement concerns a public official, 
whereas only negligence is required if the statement concerns a private 
citizen"); see 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 21 (1995). 
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1184 (D. Utah 2005). In 
Murphree, the court noted "Utah courts have defined common law malice as "ill will or 
spite." 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 (citing Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 n.3 (Utah 
1988)). The court elaborated: "In addition, in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 
P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that common law 
malice is demonstrated by statements that 'were made with ill will, were excessively 
published, or the defendant did not reasonably believe his or her statements were true.'" 
Id (quoting Russell, 842 P.2d at 905). "To be demonstrably 'true' or 'false,' the 
published statements must be statements of fact, not mere opinion or belief." B.J. 
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Barnes & Sons Trucking, Inc. v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., No. Civ. 2:05-CV-
351BSJ, 2006 WL 1472689, at *3 (D. Utah May, 22, 2006) (emphasis in original). 
The Russell court stated: "Under the common law standard of malice, to 
overcome a conditional privilege, a plaintiff must show an improper motive such as a 
desire to do harm or that the defendant did not honestly believe his statements to be true 
or that the publication was excessive." 842 P.2d at 904. Determining the honesty of a 
witness is entirely the jury's province. And, under the Brehany standard of review, the 
question whether defamation is conditionally privileged remains a question of law unless 
a genuine factual issue exists whether scope of privilege exceeded or defendant acted 
with actual malice. Ferguson raised numerous genuine factual issues of actual malice at 
trial as shown in his statement of facts presented to this Court, which 
defendants/appellees remain unable to refute or controvert (except by unsupported, 
conclusory "no evidence" statements). 
Defendants/appellees incorrectly rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
603 in an attempt to defend their position. However, section 603, comment a begins with 
the following quote, omitted from the Brief of Appellees: 
Any conditional privilege is created because the interest of the publisher, 
the recipient of the defamatory publication or some third person or an 
interest of the public is actually or apparently involved, and the knowledge 
by the recipient of the defamatory matter, if it is true, is likely to be of 
service in the protection of that interest. If the defamatory matter is not in 
any part published for its protection, the privilege is abused. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 603, comment a (1977) (emphasis added). As Ferguson 
testified and showed in the record, over-billing was simply not true. Arthur Glenn, the 
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alleged over-billing victim, did not find anything unusual in Ferguson's billing, even after 
investigation. (R. at 185, Ex. B at 22). When asked to demonstrate an honest belief, 
defendants/appellees did not show Arthur Glenn any proof of over-billing. (R. at 185, 
Ex. B at 25; 864-299 to -300, -304). The defamatory over-billing simply was not true. 
Any possible conditional privilege was abused and lost due to the untruths surrounding 
appellees' calculated method to not only fire Ferguson, but to destroy his reputation with 
his main client and then take Ferguson's case. The trial court should not have directed 
the verdict. 
ISSUE II 
Appellant wishes to correct an error made in the Brief of Appellant previously 
filed with this Court. As appellees point out, Issue II should not relate to summary 
judgment as to intentional interference with prospective business relations as to Siegfried 
and Jensen as incorrectly noted in the Statement of Issues and Summary of the 
Arguments sections of the Brief of Appellant, but rather should relate to intentional 
interference with prospective business relations as to UMIA, as specified in the 
Argument section of that brief. Appellants determined not to present the Siegfried and 
Jensen issue to this Court, but failed to properly edit the earlier portions of the brief to 
reflect that decision. However, Appellants did wish to present the intentional interference 
with prospective business relations as to UMIA to this Court, although this issue arises 
not from summary judgment, where Judge Medley correctly denied summary judgment, 
but rather as an effect of the incorrect directed verdict based on the conditional privilege 
issue. 
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Ferguson described the contextual facts and circumstances surrounding the 
defamation published to UMIA, the client for whom Ferguson did 100% work for in 
2005, by defendants/appellees. (R. at 863-69). These facts and circumstances illustrate 
his intentional interference with prospective economic relations with UMIA claim, which 
forms a substantial part of Ferguson's damages. "The tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations reaches beyond protection of an interest in an existing 
contract and protects a party's interest in prospective relationships of economic 
advantage not yet reduced to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to be)." Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 302 (Utah 1982) (citing Buckaloo v. 
Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 868-69, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 748-49 (1975); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B comment c; Prosser, Handbook of the Law of 
Torts § 130 (4th ed. 1971)). In the Leigh case, this Court recognized "a common-law 
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations," and 
adopted the Oregon definition of this tort. Id. at 304 (citing Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 
357, 361, 600 P.2d 371, 374 (1979); Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 
Or. 201,205, 209, 582 P.2d 1365, 1368, 1371 (1978)). "Under this definition, in order to 
recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered 
with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose 
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id. 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah recently reviewed these 
principles: 
n 
The "economic relations" protected by this theory are diverse. "Driving 
away an individual's existing or potential customers is the archetypical 
injury this cause of action was devised to remedy. E.g., Guillory v. Godfrey, 
134 Cal.App.2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 
119 N.W. 946 (1909); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 130 
(4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B(a)," Leigh, 657 P.2d 
at 306, but protection extends to "any prospective contractual relations ... if 
the potential contract would be of pecuniary value to the plaintiff 
(excluding contracts to marry), as well as "a continuing business or other 
customary relationship not amounting to a formal contract." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 766B comment c (1979). 
The question of interference for an "improper purpose" or by an "improper 
means" requires the weighing of several relevant factors: 
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with 
a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or 
not, consideration is given to the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct, 
(b) the actor's motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, 
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and 
the contractual interests of the other, 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference 
and 
(g) the relations between the parties. 
MacArthur, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1182-83 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767(a)-
(g) (1979)). "The alternative of improper purpose will be satisfied where it can be shown 
that the actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff...." Id. (citing 657 P.2d at 
307) (footnote & citations omitted). If the actor's conduct is directed solely to the 
satisfaction of his spite or ill will and not at all to the advancement of his competitive 
interests over the person harmed, his interference is held to be improper. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 768 comment g. When giving consideration to the factors listed 
directly above, (a) through (g), and recalling the facts Ferguson cites from the record in 
this case, improper purpose by defendants/appellees in defaming Ferguson and 
interfering with his prospective business relations becomes readily apparent, and this 
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issue flows directly from the underlying defamation in this case, for which the trial court 
should not have directed the verdict. 
ISSUES HI & IV 
The trial court should not have granted summary judgment to defendant 
Frankenburg because he was a central player in the central issue in this case, the 
defamation of Ferguson to UMIA, and the retention of all of Ferguson's UMIA legal 
business, by defendants/appellees. The trial court should not have granted defendants' 
motions in limine because the issues went to the heart of Ferguson's malice burden of 
proof and were directly relevant thereto. The totality of circumstances reviewed in 
context of the facts supported in the record in this case support a finding of actual malice 
that shows an abuse by defendants/appellees of any possibly applicable conditional 
privilege to the defamatory per se statements about Ferguson. The trial court should not 
have directed the verdict against Ferguson. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, through summary judgment, motion in limine ruling, and directed 
verdict upon close of Plaintiff s evidence disregarded the genuine issues of material fact 
and the reasonable bases in the evidence that would support a verdict. For all the 
foregoing reasons, Ferguson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
summary judgment order as to defendant Frankenburg, the trial court's motion in limine 
ruling, and the trial court's directed verdict and remand this case for trial. 
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DATED this 10th day of September 2008. 
THE SPENCE LAW FIRM, LLC 
Mel C. Orchard, III 
Attorney for Appellant 
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